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Banks as ‘fat cats’: Branching and Price Decisions in a Two-Stage 
Model of Competition 
Paolo Coccorese 





In this paper we develop an empirical two-stage model of competition for the banking 
industry  that  incorporates  the  choice  of  capacity  in  the  form  of  new  branches. It  is 
estimated using data on Italian banks for the years 1995-2009. The results show that 
the  conduct  of  banks  is  significantly  more  competitive  than  a  Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium,  and  support  the  rejection  of  the  simple  one-stage  specification,  which 
underestimates  the  degree  of  competition.  In  the  Fudenberg  and  Tirole  (1984)’s 
taxonomy, banks are found to behave as ‘fat cats’, overinvesting in the branch network 
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Introduction 
In this paper we formulate and estimate a structural model where banks compete in capacity 
and prices. Unlike the conventional models dealing with the market conduct of firms, which 
assume that either price or quantity are the only endogenous variables, we try to account 
also for the influence of an important capacity variable for banks – branch network – on the 
degree of product market competition. 
Steps in this direction have been taken by authors who try to emphasize the interactions 
between competition in output market and specific input markets, such as R&D, advertising, 
finance, labour, and capacity. For the purpose, they employ a two-stage set-up and evaluate 
the  sensitivity  of  the  estimated  market  power  of  firms  to  the  introduction  of  these  input 
variables.  By  making  them  endogenous,  one  can  have  a  clearer  idea  about  several 
interesting  issues,  for  example  the  link  between  endogenous  costs  and  market  structure 
(Sutton, 1991), the optimal antitrust policy in presence of more than one strategic variable 
(Fershtman  and  Gandal,  1994),  the  possibility  that  endogenous  capacity  affects  the 
conclusions about product market competition (Roller and Sickles, 2000), the effects that the 
degree of competition on the demand for inputs exert on competition in the product market 
(Neven  et  al.,  2006),  or  the  impact  of  labour  supply  augmenting  investments  when 
oligopsonistic firms set wages (Dewit and Leahy, 2009). 
By means of a two-stage set-up, here we investigate whether introducing in the first stage 
decisions on the branch network (a capacity variable for banks) significantly influences the 
degree  of  banks’  market  power  at  the  loan  market  level.  If  this  is  the  case,  a  correct 
assessment of market power in banking industries would also require a careful consideration 
of properly endogenized input markets. 
We test our model using data from the Italian banking sector in the years 1995-2009. The 
choice of the banking industry seems appropriate for at least three reasons. First, it is a 
fundamentally regulated industry because of its crucial role in the economy and the presence 
of notable informational problems, so a significant market power exists. 
Secondly,  in  the  last  decades  the  banking  markets  of  many  European  countries  have 
undergone  an  intense  consolidation  process  via  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Its  origin  lies 
especially in the introduction of the single currency, the reduction of cross-border barriers, 
and the development of the information and communication technologies (ICT). In Italy, a 
strong reorganization of the industry occurred as well (mainly in terms of deregulation and 
privatization  of  banks):  the  number  of  credit  institutions  reduced  and  their  average  size 
increased,  while  at  the  same  time  the  number  of  branches  remarkably  grew.  This 
generalized  concentration  wave  pushes  for  an  evaluation  of  whether  the  degree  of 
competition among banks has changed. 
Finally, the set up of brick and mortar bank branches is undoubtedly an important aspect of 
(non-price) competition among banks. They are long-run decisions that impose considerable 
(and usually sunk) costs on banks, while the choices on the interest rates concern the short 
run.  However,  in  their  lending  activity  banks  need  to  gather  information  about  resident 
clientele and local economic conditions, so as to evaluate the ability of customers to refund 
the  money.  Hence,  the  physical  presence  of  branches  appears  unavoidable  and  to  be 
maintained (Corvoisier and Gropp, 2007, p. 2). 
The focus on the Italian context seems appropriate as well. As already mentioned, since the 
1980s important transformations occurred in the Italian banking system, in order to foster 
market competition. Before 1978, credit authorities had followed a quite cautious attitude in 
evaluating whether to allow the establishment of new local bank offices, and their opening  
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was subject to discretionary economic reasons, without any automatic procedure. After the 
approval  of  the  First  European  Directive  (1977),  the  Bank  of  Italy  issued  three  ‘branch 
distribution  plans’  (1978,  1982,  1986),  i.e.  regulatory  measures  for  the  opening  of  new 
branches: they were intended to progressively relax the geographical restrictions on lending 
and  lower  the  barriers  to  entry  in  local  markets.  Finally,  in  March  1990  the  possibility  of 
setting up new bank offices was fully liberalized. 
Since then, there has been a noteworthy increase in the number of branches. They rose from 
16,596 in 1990 to 34,036 in 2009 (+105.1%), with outstanding growth rates in the period from 
1990 to 2001 (see Table 1). This pattern characterized the whole country, with only slight 
differences  among  areas,  and  caused  a  notable  transformation  of  the  overall  financial 
market.  Still  in  the  period  1990-2009,  the  loans  to  GDP  ratio  increased  from  57.8%  to 
102.8%,  the  share  of  municipalities  with  at  least  one  branch  from  62.9%  to  73.1%,  the 
average number of branches per municipality from 2 to 4.2 (+110%), the average number of 
branches per bank from 15.6 to 43.2 (+176.9%), and the average number of branches per 
million inhabitants from 292.6 to 564.8 (+93%). 
In parallel with the growth of their average size, in the same period the number of Italian 
banks declined from 1064 to 788 (-25.9%) as a result of the vigorous consolidation process 
due  to  the  worldwide  deregulation  of  capital  markets,  the  harmonization  of  financial 
legislations (especially within EU), the fast ICT progress, and a generalized reduction of entry 
barriers. 
Thus, it is crucial to carefully assess the degree of competition in the Italian banking sector: 
the  heightened  market  concentration  (caused  by  the  reduction  of  the  number  of  credit 
institutions) might have increased the market power of incumbent banks. Although previous 
studies  for  Italy  (and  for  several  other  banking  markets  as  well)  have  rejected  this 
hypothesis, further investigations that account also for other factors – such as the optimal 
investment in the branch network – seem helpful for a clear understanding of the strategic 
choices of banks and their influence on the system as a whole.
1 
It is also worth noting that our approach is based on a robust theoretical background and, 
compared to other studies on the Italian banking sector (e.g. Cerasi et al., 2000, 2002), does 
not  assume  any  predetermined  market  structure,  since  we  are  going  to  estimate  an 
endogenous conjectural variation parameter that is able to categorize ex post the type of 
competition among banks. 
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the literature on competition 
models and branching behaviour of banks. Sections 3 and 4 describe the theoretical model 
and its functional specifications for the banking industry, respectively. Section 5 discusses 
the data and the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
1 In spite of the sharp consolidation, the banking market concentration in Italy still remains relatively 
small compared to the other EU member countries: in 2009 the Herfindahl index for the Italian credit 
institutions  (calculated  on  total  assets)  was  353,  the  lowest  value  in  Europe  after  Germany  and 
Luxembourg (ECB, 2010, p. 36).  
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1. Competition, banking and branching decisions: a review of the  
  literature 
To assess the oligopoly conduct, latest empirical studies mostly employ the so-called ‘new 
empirical  industrial  organization’  (NEIO)  approach,  which  relies  on  non-structural  models 
inferring market power from the observation of firms’ conduct and requiring the estimation of 
equations based on theoretical frameworks of price and output determination. More in depth, 
these  models  try  to  test  conduct  by  directly  addressing  firms’  behaviour  through  the 
estimation of a parameter that can be interpreted as a conjectural variation coefficient (Iwata, 
1974; Appelbaum, 1979, 1982; Roberts, 1984) or as the deviation of the perceived marginal 
revenue schedule of a firm in the industry from the demand schedule (Bresnahan, 1982, 
1989;  Lau,  1982;  Alexander,  1988).  However,  they  generally  consider  only  one  strategic 
variable, usually price or quantity.
2 
NEIO techniques has been applied in banking markets by Shaffer (1989, 1993, 2004), Berg 
and Kim (1994), Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994), Coccorese (1998, 2005, 2009), Neven and 
Roller (1999), Toolsema (2002), Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), Canhoto (2004), and Uchida 
and  Tsutsui  (2005).  These  studies  cover  different  countries  and  provide  some  mixed 
evidence;  however,  imperfect  competition  in  banking  markets  is  the  predominant  and 
strongest result. 
The investigation of interest margins and Lerner indices is a direct way to get information 
about the average mark-up of prices over costs, and therefore on banks’ profitability. For 
example,  Corvoisier  and  Gropp  (2002)  and  Maudos  and  Fernandez  de  Guevara  (2007) 
employ these measures for the European banking. 
Price-based  indicators  of  competition  have  been  recently  augmented  with  non-price 
measures  of  competitive  behaviour,  under  the  hypothesis  that  banks  may  substitute  or 
complement them in certain instances (Carbo et al., 2009). Actually, in imperfect competition 
markets  non-price  strategies  may  help  firms  to  differentiate  themselves  and  thus  extract 
market power. Among non-price competition devices, it is regarded as valuable to investigate 
firms’ choice of capacity, which allows to account for strategic moves. Particularly, banks’ 
branching decision is a foremost issue. 
Branches  represent  the  main  interface  between  banks  and  clientele.  Their  territorial 
distribution is crucial for providing financial services, as they both collect deposits and grant 
loans.  The  branch  network  has  also  a  decisive  role  in  facilitating  the  provision  and 
processing of information. It helps to obtain and handle borrower-specific information in local 
geographical  areas,  improving  the  overall  quality  of  the  loan  portfolio.  In  this  respect, 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that the relaxation of the US branching regulation has 
had an important role in the increase of the rate of real per capita growth in income and 
output, because branch network proliferation has improved loan monitoring and screening. 
Setting up a brick and mortar branch is an investment that can secure profits in the future, 
but often represents a sunk cost for banks. It could be rewarding in areas where income is 
either high and expected to grow fast. On the other hand, in a competitive landscape profits 
can be hard to be precisely estimated, while the wrong choice of locating a branch in a given 
town or area is quite costly to modify. Hence, a bank that owns many branches in a region 
has much to lose and would be willing to deter entry; however, if markets are contestable this 
strategy is hard to be implemented, and one possibility is that incumbent banks saturate the 
                                                 
2 For an exhaustive survey, see Bresnahan (1989).  
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market with own branches, also considering the possibility of exploiting economies of scale 
due to the network effect. 
As Gual (1999) notes, banks can compete through both interest rates and service quality. In 
the latter case, expanding the branch network may facilitate clients’ access to the bank, thus 
improving customer service. Matching clientele’s preferences over locations thus helps to 
mitigate interest rates competition. However, these two dimensions of competition are not 
independent: on the one hand, the larger the number of branches in a market, the tougher 
the competition on interest rates; on the other hand, the degree of competition on interest 
rates affects the incentive to expand the geographical presence, in order to get higher profits 
from a wider branch network (Cerasi et al., 2000, 2002). 
This  close  relationship  suggests  the  adoption  of  a  model  of  bank  behaviour  that  jointly 
considers the choices on interest rates and branching. Several studies on banks’ behaviour 
concentrate  on  the  importance  of  this  form  of  non-price  competition  and  its  effects  on 
banking markets. 
Within  a  spatial  competition  model,  Barros  (1999)  examines  pricing  decisions  in  the 
Portuguese commercial banking in presence of product differentiation induced by location in 
local markets. He concludes that the measurement of market power and the explanation of 
margins in the banking industry need to take into account the local market nature of the 
activity, and hence a deeper understanding of branching strategies and their interactions with 
price policies. 
Pinho  (2000)  estimates  a  system  of  three  equations  for  Portugal,  where  advertising 
expenditures  and  branches  are  regarded  as  non-price  strategic  variables,  and finds that, 
while the combined effects of deregulation and reduced concentration have had a significant 
and positive impact on the use of advertising as a competitive instrument, no such effect is 
detected for branching expansion. 
Kim and Vale (2001) consider the role of the branch network in the provision of loans in 
Norway, and estimate a model of branching decision where banks explicitly take account of 
both their own existing network and their expectation of rivals’ choices. They set up a non-
price  oligopolistic  model  of  bank  behaviour  in  the  market  for  loans,  at  the  same  time 
analyzing the role of the branch network in banks’ behaviour and testing the oligopolistic 
conduct in this sector. In their model, banks are able to consider rivals’ future reaction to their 
own  introduction  of  new  branches,  and  the  analysis  provides  evidence  that  banks  are 
interdependent in their branching decisions, taking into consideration the future response 
from rival banks, and also that branching has a significant effect on banks’ market shares, 
but not on the market demand. 
Cerasi et al. (2002) employ a monopolistic competition model in order to measure branching 
costs and competitiveness for nine European banking industries, where banks are supposed 
to  decide  strategically  the  size  of  their  branching  network  anticipating  the  degree  of 
competition  faced  on  interest  rates.  According  to  their  results,  the  impact  of  the  various 
European  directives  aiming  at  deregulating  the  banking  industry  has  led  to  a  general 
increase of the degree of competition. 
Carbo et al. (2009) start from the Kim and Vale (2001)’s analysis and build a model where 
banks can compete with rivals in prices for deposits and loans as well as in branches. They 
fit this model to a sample of data for the Spanish banking system, and their results reveal 
that in Spain price competition has decreased in the loan market but has increased in the 
deposit market over the period 1986-2002, and also that the relative intensity of price versus 
non-price competition has varied over time.  
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The choice about the location of de novo branches is one of the main strategic devices that 
Italian banks have employed in the last decades in order to face competition in the various 
provincial markets.
3 In Italy the role of banks in the provision of funds is still decisive: since 
the average size of Italian firms is quite small, entrepreneurs are very dependent on banks 
for short-term credit and for funds which allow flexibility in responding to shocks (Calcagnini 
et al., 2002). Studies on banks’ branching behaviour in Italy have become popular after the 
branch deregulation occurred in the late Eighties. De Bonis et al. (1998) prove that in the 
period 1990-1996 branch expansion has reduced concentration in provincial markets, but 
mergers have increased it at the national level. Calcagnini et al. (2002) propose a model that 
aims  to  explain  the  reasons  for  which  Italian  banks  decide  to  open  new  branches  in  a 
province. It is estimated for the years 1992-1996 by means of a tobit regression, and shows 
that  this  choice  is  influenced  by  the  existing  market  structure,  the  recent  past  branch 
expansion by the bank and its rivals, the past presence of the bank in the province, and the 
fact that many municipalities in the province are still unserved. 
Cerasi et al. (2000) focus on the period 1989-1995, finding that the cost of opening branches 
has reduced, but the overall degree of competition of each local market has not significantly 
increased. 
Estimating their monopolistic competition two-stage model for the years 1990-1996, Cerasi et 
al. (2002) find that for the Italian banks there are incentives for opening new branches, as 
marginal benefits of branching outweigh marginal costs. 
Using data on 729 individual banks’ lending in 95 Italian local markets over the period 1986-
1996, Bofondi and Gobbi (2006) find that loan default rates are significantly higher for those 
banks that entered local markets without opening a branch. This means that having a branch 
on site may help to reduce the informational disadvantage. 
Our analysis shares its basic features with the structural model developed by Roller and 
Sickles (2000) for the European airline industry. Using data for the period of 1976-1990, they 
have  explicitly  estimated  a  three-equation,  two-stage  structural  model  that  considers 
competition  in  capacity  and  prices:  particularly,  in  the  first  stage  firms  make  capacity 
decisions,  and  a  product-differentiated,  price-setting  game  follows  in  the  second  stage. 
Estimation results show that higher investments in stage one induce a softer action by rival 
firms in stage two. Thus, they reject a simple one-stage specification in favour of a two-stage 
set-up, and find that some degree of market power in the product market exists, although it is 
significantly lower than in the one-stage model. In other words, firms’ market power in the 
product market is significantly overestimated if capacity competition is not accounted for. 
Neven et al. (2006) still consider the airline industry and estimate price-cost margins when 
firms  bargain  over  wages.  They  implement  a  three-equation  model  using  data  for  eight 
European airlines in the years 1976-1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs 
has important implications for the measurement of price-cost margins and the assessment of 
market power. In particular, their main results are that margins affect costs and vice versa, 
and that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices only when costs 
are  regarded  as  endogenous,  even  though  observed  margins  are  consistent  with  Nash 
behaviour. 
An  analogous  theoretical  background  supports  the  study  of  Ma  (2005),  who  develops  a 
model  in  order  to  explain  the  excess  capacity  in  the  Taiwanese  flour  industry.  Here  an 
expected effect of a firm’s first-stage investment on its rivals’ outputs in the second stage is 
                                                 
3 In Italy, the province (provincia) is an administrative district comprising a larger town or city and 
several little neighbouring towns. By and large, it corresponds to a U.S. county.  
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introduced, and the empirical evidence is that a large capacity built in the first period can be 
used  strategically  to  reduce  other  firms’  outputs  in  the  second  period.  This  causes  an 
overinvestment in the first stage and hence a misallocation of resources. 
In  what follows,  we  estimate  a  two-stage  price-setting model for  the Italian  banking  loan 
market: banks simultaneously decide whether to set up new branches (capacity) in the first 
stage, and then choose prices in the second stage. So, we treat capacity as an endogenous 
variable  (determined  in  the  first  stage)  that  affects  both  production  costs  and  market 
competition (in the second stage). This framework should allow to discover the effects of 
long-run capital investments from an individual bank on short-run price decisions. 
2. The theoretical model 
At year t, each bank faces the following demand for loans: 
qit = qit(pit, pjt, Zit)   i = 1,...,N ,  (1) 
where N is the number of banks at year t, qit is the quantity of loans demanded, pit is the price 
of  loans  charged  by  bank  i,  pjt  is  an  index  of  the  rivals’  prices,  and  Zit  is  a  vector  of 
exogenous variables affecting loans. 
The own-price effect on demand, ∂qit/∂pit, and the cross-price effect on demand, ∂qit/∂pjt, are 
supposed to be negative and positive, respectively. The value of the latter is also expected to 
be high in case loans are considered as good substitutes across banks. 
We assume that both short-run and long-run decisions on cost structure are able to affect 
banks’ profitability. In the short run, costs (as well as demand and profits) are influenced only 
by variations in the price of output (loan rate) through qit; in the long run, banks can vary their 
cost structure also by means of changes in capacity (branches, here indicated as BRit). As a 
result, the long-run cost function is: 
Cit
LR(qi(⋅), BRit | rit, ωit) = Cit
SR(qit(⋅) | BRit, ωi) + ritBRit,  (2) 
where Cit
LR(⋅) and Cit
SR(⋅) represent the long-run and the short-run specifications of the cost 
function, respectively. Short-run (variable) costs depend only on quantity, given a level of 
capacity BRit and other input prices ωit. In the long run, the level of capacity also becomes 
variable and can be purchased at its price rit. 
In the second stage, each bank has to choose pit such that it maximizes the following profit 
function (we omit the subscript t for convenience): 
πi = qi(⋅)pi – Ci
SR(qi(⋅) | BRi, ωi).  (3) 
The corresponding first-order condition is: 
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where MCi = ∂Ci
SR/∂qi is the short-run marginal cost. 




































= ε are the own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticity of 







= λ  is the conjectural variation parameter of firm i. If 
correctly identified, λ expresses the degree of coordination of banks. When λ > 0, a bank 
expects the rivals will match its price, so cooperating in keeping revenues at a profitable 
level;  perfectly  collusive  behaviour  implies  that  λ  equals  one. When  λ = 0,  the  behaviour 
foreshadows a Nash equilibrium in prices: each bank neither considers rivals’ choices when 
setting its price, nor reacts when they change their behaviour. Finally, if λ < 0, a bank wishing 
to increase its price expects the rivals to react competitively and therefore reduce their prices 
(Martin, 1993, p. 25): perfect competition requires that λ = – ∞, so that (5) turns into the well-
known p = MC condition. In line with the relevant literature (e.g.: Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; 
Roller and Sickles, 2000), we assume that the conjectural variation is the same across all 
banks. 
Let us indicate the solution of this (second-stage) maximization problem as pi* = pi(BRi, BRj), 
where BRj represents the capacity choice of the other banks. Since capacity is committed 
before a bank chooses its price, the investment decision can be used strategically: one bank 
can influence rivals’ prices through its choice of branches. 
In the first stage, banks have to select the capacity level (branches) BRi that maximizes: 
πi = qi(⋅)p*i – Ci
LR(Ci
SR, BRi) = qi(p*i, p*j, Zi)p*i – Ci
SR(qi(p*i, p*j, Zi) | BRi, ωi) – riBRi.  (6) 
The  resulting  first-order  condition  (where  the  superscript  *  is  omitted  for  notational 
convenience) is: 















































































  (7) 
We can now bring the first-order conditions of the two stages together. Particularly, we first 





























MC p q   (8) 
 
Then, we substitute (8) into (7). After some manipulations, we get:  
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  (9) 
According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), the total effect of a capacity investment BRi by 
bank i on its own profits can be decomposed into two effects. By changing BRi, bank i has a 









− , which is linked to the amount of the first-stage investment: 
more in depth, it depends on how short-run costs are affected by this investment as well as 
on the price of a unit of capacity. Clearly, this effect has no influence on the price of rival 
banks. 















− , which accounts for the influence of bank i’s capacity investment on the 
price of bank j in the second stage. Whenever this strategic effect is zero, there is no need to 
specify a two-stage framework, and the sole direct effect is able to capture the impact of 
capacity decisions on profits (by way of a one-stage simultaneous-move price game). On the 
other hand, if the strategic effect does exist, the first-stage investment of bank i can be used 
to strategically affect the other firms’ choice in the second stage. 
In our framework, the decision of bank i to open a new branch depends on how this choice 
will  affect  its  own  profits  (direct  effect),  but  also  on  how  the  other  competitors  will  react 
(strategic effect). Opening a new office affects bank i’s fixed costs because of the expenses it 
entails, but may have an additional (either positive or negative) effect on short-run costs, e.g. 
due to productive reorganisation or factor reallocation that a greater clientele can generate. 
Besides, it impacts on the other banks as well, given that it is likely to cause a migration of 
clients; the rivals could therefore react modifying their decision variable (here, price), which 
will affect in turn bank i’s demand and profits.
4 
The oligopolistic nature of banking markets should ensure that pi – MCi > 0; furthermore, by 
definition it is ∂qi/∂pj > 0. As a result, the existence and the sign of the strategic effect depend 
on the term ∂pj/∂BRi. 
Since  in  the  second  stage  banks  compete  in  prices,  choice  variables  are  strategic 
complements.  If  ∂pj/∂BRi < 0,  an  increase  in  BRi  causes  a  drop  in  both  pj  and  πi:  in 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)’s terminology, the investment in capacity makes banks ‘tough’, 
and they must adopt a ‘puppy dog’ strategy, i.e. underinvest in capacity if they want to look 
non-aggressive rivals. If ∂pj/∂BRi > 0, an increase in BRi produces an increase in both pj and 
πi; now the investment in capacity makes banks ‘soft’, so that they need to adopt a ‘fat cat’ 
strategy, i.e. overinvest in capacity in order to look non-threatening rivals. 
Thus, assessing the value and significance of ∂pj/∂BRi is crucial for understanding the right 
formulation of the game. Should it be zero, the strategic variable (capacity) of stage 1 does 
not affect the choices of stage 2, and there would be no need to specify a two-stage game 
because  banks  make  simultaneous  choices.  In  the  opposite  case,  a  two-stage  set-up 
becomes necessary. 
Starting from (4), we derive the following expressions: 
                                                 
4 In their model, Cerasi et al. (2002) discuss of an ‘expansive effect’ and a ‘competitive effect’ that are 








































































































































































=    is the own-demand effect that includes the conjectural 







=    is the cross-demand effect (hence,  j > 0). 











































































  (10c) 
Substituting (10c) into (10a) leads to: 


















  (11a) 
and 











































−   =
π  is the second-order condition for pi to be a local maximum 























1  is the negative of the cross-partial 
derivative of bank i’s profit function, i.e. the derivative of bank i’s marginal profit with respect 
to rivals’ price. 
Note that A < 0 (each bank’s profit function needs to be strictly concave in its own prices) and 
B < 0 (the cross-partial derivative of each bank’s profit function must be positive in case of 
strategic  complements,  like  prices,  which  means  that  the  reaction  functions  are  upward 
sloping). 
As   i < 0,  it  is  straightforward  that  sign{∂MCi/∂BRi} = sign{∂pi/∂BRi} = sign{∂pj/∂BRi}. 
Therefore,  when  ∂pj/∂BRi < 0  it  is  also  ∂MCi/∂BRi < 0,  meaning  that  an  increase  in  BRi  
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pushes  marginal  costs  downwards,  while  they  move  upwards  in  case  ∂MCi/∂BRi > 0  and 
∂pj/∂BRi > 0. 
Roller and Sickles (2000) emphasize that the sign of ∂MCi/∂BRi – and hence of ∂pj/∂BRi – is 
able to indicate the direction of the bias that characterizes the conduct parameter λ in case a 
two-stage formulation is not used. 
In particular, in a two-stage ‘puppy dog’ game (∂MCi/∂BRi < 0) the capacity investment lowers 
MCi and pi, but marginal costs decline more than prices (as the second-order condition of 
stage 1 requires that ∂MCi/∂BRi < ∂pi/∂BRi: see Appendix), so that a larger price-cost margin 
is associated to the same λ; this implies that a one-stage game would ignore this effect, 
leading to an upward bias in the measurement of market conduct (actually, for a lower price-
cost margin there should be a lower λ). 
When dealing with a two-stage ‘fat cat’ game (∂MCi/∂BRi > 0), an increase in BRi causes 
marginal costs to increase more than prices (in this case, it must be ∂MCi/∂BRi > ∂pi/∂BRi: 
see  Appendix),  implying  that  a  smaller  price-cost  margin  is  associated  with  a  given  λ; 
therefore, a one-stage game would result in a downward bias in the value of the conduct 
parameter (a higher price-cost margin would require a higher λ). 
Of course, if ∂MCi/∂BRi = 0 no bias exists. 
However,  all  the  above  is  true  for  any  λ > 0.  When  λ < 0,  i.e.  when  conduct  is  more 
competitive  than  a  Nash  behaviour,  the  reverse  reasoning  applies.  Actually,  when 
∂MCi/∂BRi < 0 the price-cost margin is larger in case of a one-stage game, and it lowers only 
when  λ  increases  (or  also,  when  the  absolute  value  of  λ  decreases):  in  this  instance, 
therefore, market conduct is underestimated. Conversely, for ∂MCi/∂BRi > 0, there will be an 
overestimation of the degree of market power. 
Therefore,  the  remark  of  Roller  and  Sickles  (2000,  p.  853)  needs  to  be  reformulated  as 
follows. 
Proposition 1. Whenever the capacity game can be categorized as a ‘puppy 
dog’ (i.e. ∂MCi/∂BRi < 0), then a one-stage game would result in an upward 
bias in the measurement of market conduct if λ > 0, and to a downward bias if 
λ < 0. Whenever the  capacity  game can  be  categorized  as  a  ‘fat  cat’  (i.e. 
∂MCi/∂BRi > 0), then a one-stage game would result in a downward bias in 
the measurement of market conduct if λ > 0, and to a upward bias if λ < 0. 
Finally, whenever ∂MCi/∂BRi = 0, no bias exists. 
Estimating the two-stage model requires the simultaneous estimation of Equations (1), (5) 
and  (9).  By  considering  only  Equations  (1)  and  (5),  one  would  implicitly  assume  that 
investments in capacity are exogenous (i.e. a one-stage set-up), at the same time getting a 
biased estimation of the conduct parameter λ whenever ∂pj/∂BRi ≠ 0. 
3. Empirical specification 
In our three-equation model, the demand is the following: 
it i it it jt it it t a BRSHARE a GDP a p a p a q τ γ + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln   (1a)  
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where τ is the error term. The dependent variable qit is the amount of loans of bank i at year 
t. Among the exogenous variables, we include bank i’s loan rate (pit), a weighted average of 
rivals’ loan rates (pjt), a measure of Gross Domestic Product that takes into account the 
regional distribution of bank i’s branches (GDPit), the share of branches that bank i manages 
in  the  country  (BRSHAREit),  and  a  time  trend  t.  In  order  to  capture  other  possible 
characteristics of banks that do not change over time and affect the demand for loans, we 
also add a dummy γi for each bank in the sample. 
For all banks, pit is calculated as the ratio between interest revenues and customer loans, 
while pjt has been built starting from the regional loan rates (as provided by the Bank of Italy), 
each weighted by the number of branches of bank i in that region. A similar procedure has 
been used for the level of GDP, which is inserted as a proxy for aggregate demand. Finally, 
BRSHARE allows to take into account the size of banks’ branch network.
5 Apart from pit, all 
the above variables are expected to be positively correlated with loans. 



















where  ϕ  is  the  error  term,  a1  and  a2  are  the  own-price  and  the  cross-price  elasticities, 
respectively, as derived from Equation (1a), and MCit is the (linear) short-run marginal cost, 
specified as: 
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It is assumed to be dependent on branches (BRit, the capacity variable), two factor prices – 
namely,  deposits  (ω1it,  calculated  as  the  ratio  between  interest  expenses  and  customer 
deposits) and labour (ω2it, given by the ratio between personnel expenses and the number of 
employees) – and two other characteristics that are supposed to affect short-run costs: the 
number of employees per branch (EMPLBRit) and the percentage of provinces where the 
bank owns at least one branch (PROVPRESit). A time trend is also added. 
The variable EMPLBRit is used as a measure of service quality (and therefore to account for 
service  competition).  Actually,  more  workers  per  branch  should  ensure  a  more  accurate 
service for customers, because they allow shorter waiting times and foster valued human 
interactions (Dick, 2007, p. 64). The expected sign of this variable is however unpredictable: 
a higher ratio could allow an expansion of the amount of loans per worker (because of the 
better  quality),  but  also  impose  more  costs  to  the  branch  if  this  business  growth  is  not 
enough. 
The share of provinces in which the bank operates, PROVPRESit, should capture the level of 
geographic diversification: being linked to the size of the overall bank network – hence to the 
convenience to the consumer – this attribute has been already found to significantly affect 
the customer’s choice of a bank (Dick, 2008). For this reason, it should have a favourable 
impact on costs, and therefore be negatively correlated with marginal costs. 
                                                 
5 Note that BRSHARE can be regarded as an exogenous variable (unlike BR), since it depends on the 
choices of all banks operating in the industry at any given year.  
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(5b) 
The third equation to be estimated within our two-stage model is the first-order condition of 
stage 1, as rearranged in (9) so as to consider also the optimality condition of stage 2 and 
emphasize both the direct and the strategic effect of a capacity investment: 
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where φ is the error term. The price of capital rit is computed dividing all the operating costs 
different from those related to deposits and labour by the number of branches. MCit is again 



















= α   plays  a  key  role  in  the  whole  model,  as  its  estimated  value  (and 
significance) will indicate if the two-stage formulation of this game is correct. 
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It is presumed linear in the level of output, qit, and other two characteristics measuring the 
potential productivity of capital: the percentage of each bank’s branches that are located in 
those  provinces  that  belong to the first quartile of  the  loans  distribution  over  the country 
(BRFQLOANit),  and  the  number  of  branches  per  million  of  inhabitants  (BRPOPit). A  time 
trend is again included. 
The  variable  BRFQLOAN  takes  into  account  the  geographical  location  of  branches:  if  a 
higher share of local offices operates in areas where loan contracts are frequent, the same 
resources  needed  for  some  inputs  (e.g.  labour  or  running  costs)  should  generate  more 
lending  activity,  with  a  beneficial  impact  on  costs;  as  a  result,  the  sign  of  the  related 
coefficient is expected to be negative. 
The variable BRPOP is used as a proxy for branch density: it is likely that more branches per 
each million of inhabitants guarantee more business, but they should also impose higher 
costs on banks. Hence, we expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
We can substitute (12) and (13) into (9a), getting  
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To sum up, we estimate a system of three equations: (1a), (5b) and (9b). As Roller and 
Sickles (2000) note, estimating a two-equation system with the demand function and the first-
order  condition  of  stage  2  (i.e.  with  capacity  investment  treated  as  exogenous)  could 
introduce  potential  simultaneity  bias  and  lead  to  less  efficient  estimates;  additionally, 
introducing the first-order condition of stage 1 as a third equation where the strategic two-
stage set-up is however ignored could imply its misspecification. 
We use nonlinear three-stage least squares, thus endogenizing banks’ capital stock (BRi), 
output  (qi)  and  price  (pi),  and  securing  precise  and  efficient  estimates,  which  are  further 
improved  by  the  simultaneous  estimation  of  the  three  equations  and  the  various  cross-
equation restrictions. Because of the endogeneity of BRi, qi and pi, we use their first and 
second lagged values as instruments, together with the lagged values of pj at t–1 and t–2, in 
order to deal with possible problems of correlation between these variables and the error 
terms. We also include all the exogenous variables as instruments, together with banks’ total 
assets, time trend and bank dummies. 
4.   Data and estimation 
Our banks’ income statement and balance sheet figures are drawn from ABI Banking Data, 
the database managed by the Italian Banking Association, and cover the period 1995-2009. 
Given that this study aims to incorporate the capacity decisions of banks and their impact on 
rivals, we need to consider sizeable credit institutions that operate in geographically large 
areas. As a consequence, for each year we have selected only those banks whose size was 
classified either as “main”, “big” or “medium” by the Central Bank of Italy. Furthermore, we 
have dropped banks whose absolute percentage variation of branches with respect to the 
previous year exceeds 50%: this allows to keep the capacity choices separate from other 
operations like mergers, acquisitions or reorganizations. 
After this screening, we have been left with 1417 observations regarding 117 banks. Table 2 
reports  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the  sample.  Official  data  on  the  geographical 
distribution of branches and loans, as well as regional data on loan rates, come from the 
Bank of Italy, while the information regarding GDP and population are made available by 
ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of Statistics). All economic figures have been deflated 
using the GDP deflator with 2000 as the base year. 
We estimate our model for the whole sample, as well as for two geographical sub-samples 
(North vs. Center and South) and for the group of largest banks, identified as those having 
branches in at least a half of the 20 Italian regions. The results of system estimations are 
shown in Table 3. When not otherwise specified, our reference estimation will be the one 
regarding the whole sample of banks (first column of Table 3). 
As expected, in the demand equation the coefficients of pi and pj have always a negative and 
positive sign, respectively, and are statistically significant at the 1% level. This confirms a 
downward-sloping demand function as well as a positive cross-price elasticity for loans. 
The (relatively) small own-price elasticity, a1, suggests that for customers loans have poor 
substitutes.  Since  a monopolistic firm  sets  its  price  on the  elastic  portion  of the  demand  
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function, we deduce that banks are generally able to exercise their market power only to a 
little extent in their respective market niches. 
The cross-price elasticity, a2, is generally larger than the absolute own-price elasticity (this 
does not happen for the North). However, we can reject the hypothesis that |a1| ≥ a2 only for 
Central and Southern regions and for the group of the largest banks: in these sub-samples, 
the fact that loans appear to be more sensitive to variation in pj rather than in pi indicates that 
they  are  regarded  as  good  substitutes  across  banks,  a  signal  of  a  considerable  level  of 
competition among credit institutions. 
Turning to the whole sample, the absolute own-demand effect  i is only slightly lower than 
the cross-demand effect  j (–679.7 vs. +741.3). Overall, the fact that the output of a bank is 
affected by an own-price change in a broadly similar way as by a rival’s price change further 
confirms  the  good  degree  of  competitiveness  of  the  loan  market  in  the  period  under 
investigation. 
The variable GDP has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. However, its impact 
on loans is not particularly high: a one percent growth in the level of GDP of the areas where 
banks operate causes a 0.51% increase in their loan demand. The coefficient of BRSHARE 
is  also  positive  and  significant,  suggesting that  a  larger  size  of  the  branch  network,  and 
hence a widespread presence over the territory, guarantees a larger demand for loans. The 
effect of time on loans is significant, and points to an increase in their demand during years. 
Regarding the short-run marginal cost (stage 2), b1 is positive and significant at the 1% level 
in  two  over  four  regressions.  In  these  samples,  there  is  evidence  that  the  number  of 
branches (i.e. capital) has a positive effect on MC: adding capacity causes an increase in 
marginal costs of production. However, we shall discuss this later on. 
The prices of deposits and labour appear not to affect marginal costs in the reference model. 
On  the  contrary,  in  Northern  regions  the  first  price  exhibits  a  negative  and  significant 
coefficient. One explanation for this result is that deposits are characterized by a high degree 
of factor substitution, so that banks react to an increase in their prices by shifting to other 
inputs that are less costly (Neven and Roller, 1999, p. 1070). 
In two over four regressions, the ratio between employees and branches (EMPLBR) is found 
to significantly lower marginal costs. This should mean that more labour-intensive offices are 
better managed and, all else equal, impose less costs as loans increase, possibly because 
their  better  service  quality  provides  access  to  larger  flows  of  both  new  and  existing 
customers. 
The coefficient related to the provincial presence (PROVPRES) is also negative but is again 
significant  only  in  two  models:  here,  as  expected,  banks  with  a  wider  geographic 
diversification are characterized by lower marginal costs. 
Finally,  short-run  marginal  costs  show  a  downward  trend  over  time  only  for  the  whole 
sample. 
The value of the conjectural parameter λ is negative and highly significant in all regressions. 
It amounts to -0.17 in the reference model.
6 As a result, we are able to reject the hypothesis 
that there is monopoly power or coordination among the Italian banks. Quite to contrary, their 
behaviour appears to be more competitive than in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices. The 
above estimated value means that, if bank i increases its loan market rate by, say, 10% with 
respect to the previous value, it expects that rivals will react by lowering their rate by 1.7%, 
                                                 
6 Our findings are in line with Coccorese (2005), who gets negative conjectural parameters for the 
Italian banking sector.  
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while  in  a  Bertrand-Nash  game  they  would  have  left  it  unchanged,  and  in  a  cooperative 
framework they would have raised it as well.
7 This outcome is comparable with the evidence 
of  other  studies  that  have  investigated  the  market  power  of  Italian  credit  institutions  in 
analogous periods of time.
8 Actually, many of them suggest that monopolistic competition is 
the best description of the Italian banking industry.
9 
By means of the right-hand side of Equation (5b), we can calculate the average mark-up over 
marginal costs, which amounts to 108.6% for the whole sample. Given that the Bertrand-
Nash behaviour (λ = 0) would imply a mark-up of 132.8% (and even higher values in case of 
monopolization), pricing in the Italian banking market appears rather competitive. 
It is worth noting that the value of the conjectural parameter notably differs within the country. 
Competition appears stronger in the North (-0.29) than in the Center and South of Italy (-
0.11). Once more, it turns out that in Italy less wealthy regions are characterized by a lower 
degree of banking competition (Coccorese, 2004, 2008). 
As for the marginal cost of capital (stage 1), parameter estimates are generally significant. 
This type of cost increases as the level of output (q) grows: more loans are therefore coupled 
with  higher  expenditures  for  branches  (however,  this  does  not  happen  for  Central  and 
Southern regions). 
The coefficient of BRFQLOAN is negative, confirming that marginal costs are lower for banks 
whose  branches  are  mainly  located  where  the  volume  of  the  demand  for  loans  is  more 
considerable. This parameter is not significant only for the biggest banks, probably because 
all of them do operate in the most central areas. 
In contrast, the positive sign of BRPOP means that more branch offices per inhabitant raise 
the marginal cost of capital. Finally, the time trend captures an increase in this type of costs 
for the years under consideration (except for the largest banks, for which the marginal cost of 
capital appears to have decreased). 
One  key  aspect  of  this  analysis  is  to  assess  whether  a  two-stage  formulation  of  the 
competition model is correct (and also desirable). To this purpose, we need to study the 
effect of capital (i.e. branches) on short-run marginal costs. As observed beforehand, the 
coefficient of BR in the short-run marginal cost equation (b1) is always positive, and also 
significant at the 1% level in two over four models; in addition, the estimated coefficient of the 
variable α = ∂pj/∂BRi is also positive and highly significant in all specifications. This evidence 
is  in  line  with  our  expectations,  as  earlier  we  have  demonstrated  that  it  must  be 
sign{∂MCi/∂BRi} = sign{∂pj/∂BRi}. Besides, the (high) significance of the above coefficients 
makes clear that the capacity variable of stage 1 has a major impact on the choices of the 
following stage. So, the one-stage specification must be rejected in favour of a two-stage 
model. 
The positive sign of both b1 and α suggests that setting up new branches makes banks ‘soft’: 
they  overinvest  in  capacity  in  order  to  be  less  aggressive.  Thus,  they  follow  a  ‘fat  cat’ 
strategy. The intuition behind this result appears quite interesting, and can be explained as 
follows. When the Bank of Italy deregulated the branch opening all over the country in 1990, 
making much easier to get the relevant authorizations, incumbent banks realized that new 
                                                 
7 On the contrary, Carbo et al. (2009) find evidence of a strong matching behaviour in terms of price 
competition for the Spanish banking industry in the period 1986-2002, being the value of the estimated 
conjectural variation parameters positive and significant. 
8 Among others, see Coccorese (2005) and van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). 
9 As examples, see Bikker and Haaf (2002), Coccorese (2004), and Casu and Girardone (2009).  
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entries in the various local markets would have been inevitable. Finding entry deterrence too 
costly, they opted for accommodation and concentrated on maximizing their own profits. 
Since  prices  are  supposed  strategic  complements  for  banks  (Bulow  et  al.,  1985),  an 
investment in capacity (branches) from bank i would have the same effect on both its own 
and competitors’ profits. Our empirical evidence that ∂MCj/∂BRi > 0 and ∂pi/∂BRi > 0
10 means 
that the investment BRi increases both marginal cost and price of bank i. In turn, a higher 
price for bank i forces the other banks to charge a higher price as well (because of strategic 
complementarity of prices), which helps bank i’s profits. As a result, the optimal choice for 
bank i is to overinvest (keeping a ‘fat cat’ profile) so as not to look aggressive and trigger an 
aggressive  reaction  by  rivals.  We  may  also  say  that  a  bank  competing  in  prices  in  an 
accommodation framework ought to look inoffensive in order not to induce its rivals to cut 
their prices. To pursue this aim, it needs to take actions that commit it to charge a high price, 
i.e. investments that increase production costs, here corresponding to the opening of new 
branches (Tirole, 1988, pp. 326-328). This ‘fat cat’ strategy consists in an overinvestment in 
capacity in the first stage that accommodates entry by committing the incumbent to play less 
aggressively in the (post-entry) second stage (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984, p. 365). 
There is another important result deriving from our estimations. As formerly discussed, since 
we  are  dealing  with  a  ‘fat  cat’  game  (as  ∂MCj/∂BRi > 0)  where  the  conjectural  variation 
parameter λ is negative, employing a one-stage framework that does not include the capacity 
choice would produce an upward bias in the estimate of market conduct (i.e. its absolute 
value would be lower). Strictly speaking, ignoring the strategic linkages between competition 
in capacity and prices makes the competition look weaker than it actually is. 
To check empirically this result, and also quantify the magnitude and direction of the bias, we 
have estimated another group of systems where the endogeneity of branching decisions has 
been ignored. Particularly, we have considered a one-stage simultaneous model where the 
equations of both the short-run marginal cost and the marginal cost of capital have been 
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(5c) 
In (5c), the capacity variable BRit has been replaced by the price of capital rit. In this way, we 
come back to a well-specified marginal cost function, and there is no difference between 
short-run and long-run costs anymore (Roller and Sickles, 2000, p. 858). 
The new models are composed by Equations (1a) and (5c), and correspond to the customary 
structural models that are often employed when studying industries with market power. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results. The sign and significance of the coefficients of the 
demand equation do not change. It is worth only noting that the absolute values of both a1 
and a2 are slightly higher than before. Regarding the behavioural index, we find a strong 
confirmation to our conjecture about the direction of bias (see Proposition 1). Particularly, the 
conjectural derivative λ is always higher in the one-stage estimation than in the two-stage 
framework: as an example, for the whole sample it increases from -0.1667 to -0.0178 (still 
statistically significant at the 1% level). This means that, as λ < 0, in our ‘fat cat’ game the 
                                                 
10 Recall that sign{∂pi/∂BRi} = sign{∂pj/∂BRi}: see Section 3.  
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two-stage  framework  significantly  adjusts  downward  the  value  of  the  market  conduct 
parameter and the measurement of the market power of incumbent firms. 
In order that the results of our two-stage model be economically meaningful, we need that 
the second-order conditions of stages 2 and 1 are satisfied. As shown in the Appendix, for 














q . This always holds, given that – according to the 
functional form of demand here adopted as well as to the estimated parameters – we have 






















q , and λ < 0. 
With regard to stage 1, since b1 = ∂MCi/∂BRi > 0, we need that ∂pi/∂BRi – ∂MCi/∂BRi < 0. This 
condition  is  also  satisfied  at  the  sample  means for  all  specifications: for  example,  in  the 



























i , so that the difference between them amounts to -0.00012 (for the 
other models, the corresponding differences are -0.00013, -0.00002 and -0.00001). 
Another restriction that must be met is the first-order condition of stage 1, namely (9). In our 














MC p , because each term of this strategic effect on πi of an 



















)  is  greater  than  zero.  A 
positive strategic effect means that investing in branches from bank i causes an increase in 
the rivals’ price (the ‘fat cat’ effect), and this generates an increase in bank i’s loans as well 









indicating that the direct effect of investing in capacity (branches) must be negative: this 
means that setting up a branch is unprofitable by itself (i.e. costly) for bank i, and that the 
incentive to invest in capacity is entirely attributable to the strategic effect. According to our 
empirical results, this direct effect is always negative at the sample means (and amounts to -
87.45 in the reference sample).  
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5.   Conclusions 
This  paper  has  focused  on  estimating  the  conduct  of  Italian  banks  in  presence  of 
endogenous branching decisions, which are among the most studied measures of non-price 
competition in banking. Methodologically, this has been done by adding to the typical two-
equation model (a demand function plus a first-order condition in the loan market) a third 
equation that records how capacity decisions (regarding de novo branches) affect short-run 
marginal costs. 
The Italian banking industry represents an ideal testing ground for our model. In the recent 
years there have been both a deregulation wave and a sharp increase in the number of 
branches, while at the same time the number of banks has reduced. Hence, an endogenous 
treatment of branch decisions appears appropriate. 
We have estimate this model using data on a group of (large-size and medium-size) Italian 
banks for the years 1995-2009. Our results point toward a rejection of the simple one-stage 
specification, thus confirming the role of non-price strategic behaviour as a key attribute of 
firms’ conduct that stems from their interdependence in an imperfectly competitive context. 
Moreover, we show that the market conduct of banks in the two-stage model is significantly 
more competitive than a Bertrand-Nash game as well as than that coming from a one-stage 
formulation. Finally, the strategic behaviour of banks toward branches is such that, in the 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)’s terminology, they behave as ‘fat cats’, overinvesting in their 
office network (which causes an increase in marginal costs) so as to keep prices high and, 
as a consequence, accommodate entry.   
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Appendix – Second-order conditions 
Stage 2 































































































Since our two-stage marginal cost function (12) does not depend on the variable qi, it is 
∂MCi / ∂qi = 0. So the above second-order condition holds whenever  i < 0. 
Stage 1 
Starting  from  (9),  and  assuming  our  two-stage  functional  specification  (13)  of  ∂Ci
SR/∂BRi, 









































Recall that ∂qi / ∂pj > 0, and also that sign{∂MCi / ∂BRi} = sign{∂pi / ∂BRi} = sign{∂pj / ∂BRi}. 
This means that: a) when ∂MCi / ∂BRi < 0, the above second-order condition is satisfied for 
0 / / > ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ i i i i BR MC BR p ; b) when ∂MCi / ∂BRi > 0, we need that  0 / / < ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ i i i i BR MC BR p .  
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1990  16596  1064  15.6  6.6  2  62.9  292.6  57.8 
1991  18396  1043  17.6  10.8  2.3  64.6  324.1  60.6 
1992  19822  1025  19.3  7.8  2.4  66.7  349.0  66.3 
1993  22004  992  21.5  7.4  2.6  67.6  387.2  67.2 
1994  23000  965  23.3  5.4  2.8  69  404.6  64 
1995  24040  976  24  4.3  2.9  69.6  422.9  65.3 
1996  24406  938  26  4.2  3  70.1  429.2  64.3 
1997  25250  935  27  3.5  3.1  70.4  443.8  65.1 
1998  26258  922  28.5  4  3.2  73.1  461.4  68.1 
1999  27134  875  31  3.3  3.4  73.4  476.7  72.1 
2000  28177  841  33.5  3.9  3.5  73.3  494.8  76.5 
2001  29270  830  35.3  3.8  3.6  73.4  513.7  77.8 
2002  29926  814  36.8  2.2  3.7  73.3  523.6  79.3 
2003  30480  789  38.7  1.8  3.8  73.2  529.1  81.7 
2004  30944  778  39.8  1.5  3.8  73.1  531.9  82.7 
2005  31501  783  40.2  1.8  3.9  73.1  537.5  86.7 
2006  32338  793  40.8  2.7  4  73.1  548.6  92.3 
2007  33229  806  41.2  2.8  4.1  73  559.6  97.1 
2008  34146  799  42.7  2.8  4.2  73.1  570.7  99.6 
2009  34036  788  43.2  -0.3  4.2  73.1  564.8  102.8 
Table 1 – Structural changes in the Italian banking industry (1990-2009)  
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Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Median 
q  7140.5  14349.5  191.6  168307.8  2203.4 
pi  9.67  5.14  1.68  32.71  7.76 
BR  226.36  325.77  14  3142  98 
pj  7.64  2.41  4.66  15.76  6.83 
GDP  102954.2  62236.4  19922.1  267467.7  98091.5 
BRSHARE  0.77  1.08  0.06  9.46  0.32 
ω1  4.31  2.39  0.53  17.27  3.60 
ω2  56.95  7.22  16.27  99.10  56.49 
r  421.12  166.91  153.64  2413.10  387.92 
EMPLBR  10.85  3.63  5.67  37.61  10.09 
PROVPRES  18.70  24.12  0.93  100  7.77 
BRFQLOAN  51.96  32.35  0  100  60.82 
BRPOP  3.91  5.61  0.25  53.14  1.69 
Table 2 – Sample descriptive statistics (1995-2009) 
 
Note: 
q = total customer loans (millions of 2000 euro) 
pi = interest revenue / total customer loans (percentage) 
BR = number of branches (units) 
pj = interest revenue / total customer loans (percentage) 
GDP = weighted Gross Domestic Product (millions of 2000 euro) 
BRSHARE = number of branches of the bank / total number of branches in the country (percentage) 
ω1 = interest expenses / total deposits (percentage) 
ω2 = labour costs / number of employees (thousands of 2000 euro) 
r = other operating costs / number of branches (thousands of 2000 euro) 
EMPLBR = employees per branch (units) 
PROVPRES = share of provinces where the bank owns at least one branch (percentage) 
BRFQLOAN = share of branches in local markets with loans over the first quartile (percentage) 
BRPOP = branches per million of inhabitants (units) 
Number of banks in the sample: 117 
Number of observations: 1417  
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    Whole sample  North  Center & South  Banks operating in more 
than 10 regions 
 
Variable    Coefficient  t-value    Coefficient  t-value    Coefficient  t-value    Coefficient  t-value   
    Demand equation   
lnpi  a1  -0.75324  -26.20  ***  -0.61511  -17.75  ***  -0.81430  -14.29  ***  -0.58733  -8.89  ***   
lnpj  a2  0.79316  19.65  ***  0.61096  13.18  ***  0.96903  12.16  ***  0.87805  8.56  ***   
lnGDPi  a3  0.51432  8.52  ***  0.54436  7.05  ***  0.76424  60.06  ***  0.69649  35.40  ***   
lnBRSHAREi  a4  0.89906  29.45  ***  0.81835  21.29  ***  0.67934  15.26  ***  0.91908  13.17  ***   
t  a5  0.01836  8.24  ***  0.02978  10.59  ***  0.01451  3.84  ***  0.01762  2.60  ***   
    Short-run marginal cost (stage 2)   
Constant  b0  -0.03098  -0.12    -0.57681  -1.73  *  -0.86659  -1.47    0.99213  1.25   
BR i  b1  0.00039  4.17  ***  0.00035  2.95  ***  0.00014  0.30    0.00010  0.55   
ω1ι  b2  0.00862  0.39    -0.08391  -2.58  ***  0.02679  0.55    -0.06355  -0.69   
ω2ι  b3  -0.00355  -1.10    -0.00416  -0.88    0.00120  0.18    -0.01186  -1.44   
EMPLBRi  b4  -0.02391  -2.41  **  -0.01229  -0.80    0.03102  1.43    -0.07940  -3.40  ***   
PROVPRESi  b5  -0.00334  -2.16  **  -0.00490  -2.47  **  -0.00407  -0.71    -0.00219  -0.45   
t  b6  -0.02861  -2.73  ***  -0.02549  -1.82  *  -0.00988  -0.41    -0.03775  -0.99   
    Marginal cost of capital (stage 1)   
Constant  c0  -388.13240  -30.13  ***  -
389.55595  -20.62  ***  -395.09975  -23.78  ***  -510.32980  -3.85  ***   
qi  c1  0.01043  4.85  ***  0.01032  3.18  ***  0.00303  1.24    0.01790  4.37  ***   
BRFQLOANi  c2  -0.92760  -7.32  ***  -0.82281  -4.71  ***  -1.45437  -6.50  ***  1.10102  0.61   
BRPOPi  c3  13.60211  8.53  ***  10.81521  5.56  ***  23.95357  8.19  ***  21.43891  6.05  ***   
t  c4  2.10316  2.03  **  1.95626  1.35    3.08207  2.26  **  -19.87231  -3.81  ***   
    Parameters   
Conjectural 
derivative  λ  -0.16662  -6.57  ***  -0.28877  -6.39  ***  -0.10827  -2.82  ***  -0.23584  -4.11  *** 
 
∂pj / ∂BRi  α  0.01916  7.44  ***  0.02039  4.63  ***  0.01378  5.05  ***  0.02045  5.05  *** 
 
N. of observations  1417      862      555      226     
N. of banks    117      74      43      25     
Table 3 – Two-stage simultaneous equation model: estimation results 
 
Note: 
The system has been estimated with three-stage least squares. 
The instruments used are: levels and logs of first-lagged and second-lagged qi, pi, pj and BRi; levels and logs of 
GDPi, BRSHAREi, ω1i, ω2i, ri, EMPLBRi, PROVPRESi, BRFQLOANi, BRPOPi and total assets; time trend; bank 
dummies. 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. 
In the demand equation a set of dummy variables capturing bank effects is also added (coefficient estimates are 
not reported).  
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    Whole sample  North  Center & South  Banks operating in 
more than 10 regions 
 
Variable    Coefficient  t-value    Coefficient  t-value    Coefficient  t-value    Coefficient  t-value     
    Demand equation   
lnpi  a1  -0.95595  -85.36  ***  -0.86308  -44.73  ***  -0.98839  -84.68  ***  -0.81762  -23.21  ***   
lnpj  a2  1.01624  35.66  ***  0.87928  25.61  ***  1.18442  23.11  ***  1.08306  12.78  ***   
lnGDPi  a3  0.51683  8.36  ***  0.58224  7.47  ***  0.77530  61.62  ***  0.71269  39.66  ***   
lnBRSHAREi  a4  0.89144  28.53  ***  0.82955  21.31  ***  0.56844  12.81  ***  0.92172  14.30  ***   
t  a5  0.00984  4.97  ***  0.01823  7.22  ***  0.00989  3.19  ***  0.00846  1.44     
    Marginal cost   
Constant  b0  -0.03168  -0.44    -0.21345  -1.72  *  -0.00844  -0.11    -0.50050  -1.76  *    
BR i  b1  0.00001  -0.13    0.00010  0.83    -0.00004  -0.76    -0.00016  -0.90     
ω1ι  b2  -0.02238  -3.62  ***  -0.06549  -5.51  ***  -0.00708  -1.21  ***  -0.13018  -3.86  ***   
ω2ι  b3  -0.00099  -1.02    -0.00238  -1.38    -0.00012  -0.13    -0.00441  -1.49     
EMPLBRi  b4  -0.00053  -0.16    -0.00209  -0.30    0.00012  0.04    0.01226  1.27     
PROVPRESi  b5  0.00025  0.76    -0.00033  -0.58    0.00022  0.67    -0.01529  -0.23     
t  b6  -0.00020  -0.07    0.00122  0.24    -0.00001  0.00    0.01529  1.17     
    Behavioural parameter   
Conjectural 
derivative  λ  -0.01777  -3.28  ***  -0.06158  -5.56  ***  -0.00382  -0.80    -0.04890  -3.84  *** 
 
N. of observations  1417      862      555      226       
N. of banks    117      74      43      25       
Table 4 – One-stage simultaneous equation model: estimation results 
 
Note: 
The system has been estimated with three-stage least squares. 
The instruments used are: levels and logs of first-lagged and second-lagged qi, pi, pj and BRi; levels and logs of 
GDPi, BRSHAREi, ω1i, ω2i, ri, EMPLBRi, PROVPRESi, BRFQLOANi, BRPOPi and total assets; time trend; bank 
dummies. 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. 
In the demand equation a set of dummy variables capturing bank effects is also added (coefficient estimates are 
not reported).  
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